Under consideration for publication in Math. Struct. in Comp. Science

Detection and Diagnosis of Deviations in Distributed Systems of Autonomous Agents

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Received 7 July 2022

Given the complexity of cyber-physical systems, such as swarms of drones, often deviations, from a planned mission or protocol, occur which may in some cases lead to harm and losses. To increase the robustness of such systems, it is necessary to detect when deviations happen and diagnose the cause(s) for a deviation. We build on our previous work on soft agents, a formal framework based on using rewriting logic for specifying and reasoning about distributed cyber-physical systems, to develop methods for diagnosis of cyber-physical systems at design time. We accomplish this by (1) extending the soft agents framework with Fault Models; (2) proposing a protocol specification language and the definition of protocol deviations; and (3) development of workflows/algorithms for detection and diagnosis of protocol deviations. Our approach is partially inspired by existing work using counterfactual reasoning for fault ascription. We demonstrate our machinery with a collection of experiments.

1. Introduction

Verification of cyber-physical systems (CPS) is challenging as they may deviate from intended behavior due to unexpected environment interference, imprecision of sensors, or simply non-complying implementations. Such deviations may lead to hazardous situations as many CPS, such as unmanned aerial vehicles, may carry out safety-critical tasks. For example, the malfunctioning of a drone delivering a package may cause the drone to be out of energy and crash.

It is therefore important to be able to evaluate, at design time, the ability of systems under development to carry out missions as planned despite unexpected events, such as sensor faults or environment perturbations. The system should not deviate from planned behavior, and if a deviation occurs, the system should be able to recover or at least avoid causing harm. For example, if a drone detects that it is too far from a charging station, it should start heading back if necessary. Thus to carry out missions in unpredictable environments, cyber-physical agents need sufficient sensors to adequately determine their situation and to adapt to unexpected situations.

Given the many different types of faults that may occur, addressing all possible faults by, for example, using better sensors, or with more redundancy, will have great impact on the cost of the system implementation. An alternative approach is to identify at design time faults that the system is unable to deal with. For example, if we can determine that a faulty location sensor can cause the system to be dangerously out of bounds, or fail to meet a critical goal, but a faulty energy sensor does not cause a problem, then more effort can be invested in addressing the faulty location sensor and less effort on addressing energy sensor faults.

Formal methods and tools have been used for verifying the safety (Moradi et al., 2020; Kamali

et al., 2017; Mason et al., 2017; Sha et al., 2009; Mitra, 2021) and security (Dantas et al., 2020) of CPS. While some works investigate the effect of faults (or attacks) on some aspects, such as communication delays, they do not propose systematic means to identify causes for deviations.

The main goal of the work presented in this paper is to enable the use of formal methods for automated design time discovery of unexpected behavior of CPS operating in environments exhibiting faults or other threats, and determining potential causes for this undesired behavior. This allows designs to be adapted to meet many of the challenges before building and testing them. Our work is intended for use during early stages of design and development. During this phase, the mission that the CPS has to perform is specified, *e.g.*, visit some points (Mason et al., 2017), or be able to autonomously follow vehicles ahead (Moradi et al., 2020; Dantas et al., 2020). Moreover, high level requirements are developed, *e.g.*, the number of CPS agents required, their energy resources, etc. During the specification of these requirements, it is important to understand/discover as well how faults may affect the capacity of CPSes to accomplish their mission.[†]

We build on the soft agents (SA) framework (Talcott et al., 2015), which is a formal framework for specifying and verifying adaptive cyber-physical systems using the Maude rewriting logic system (Meseguer, 1992; Clavel et al., 2007). In soft agents, both agent state and the environment are modeled by separate collections of logical assertions called knowledge bases. This supports modeling of both cyber and physical aspects of a system and there interactions. An agents local knowledge base represents its perception of the environment while the environment knowledge base represents ground truth. To specify a CPS model, one needs only specify (i) the logic used by agents to make decisions about actions to perform based on local knowledge and sensing the environment; and (ii) the laws determining how the environment is changed by agent actions. The SA framework provides useful data structures and rules for execution to study how system configurations evolve over time.

This paper presents the following contributions:

— **Formalized Fault Models:** We extend SA with fault models which may be associated with sensors and actuators. Fault models specify probabilistic distributions on the rate of faults, both erroneous faults, *e.g.*, wrong measurements, and loss faults, *e.g.*, loss of sensors. From the fault specifications, our machinery can execute SA specifications in which faults may occur. SA distinguishes the agent's view of the world specified by its local knowledge base and the (model of) actual world, the environment knowledge base. The effects of fault models in the operational semantics of soft agents specifications lead to mismatches between an agent's local knowledge base and the environment knowledge base.

— **Formalized Behavior Requirements as Protocols** For the purpose of understanding the impact of faults and other environmental perturbations on the behavior of a CPS we want a specification that captures both a high level plan and conditions that should hold. Thus we wanted a language more abstract than rewrite rules, but more operational than temporal logics. We took inspiration from protocols used in regulated collaborative systems (Kanovich et al., 2017) such as clinical trials. For this purpose we define a protocol specification lan-

[†] Our work is not about the verification of CPS controllers carried out during later stages of development for which there is much work done in the literature, *e.g.*, using hybrid automata (Alur et al., 1992; Mitra, 2021).

guage. A protocol specifies which events are expected to happen during a correct execution of a mission; timing constraints to be satisfied by the agents in the form of arithmetic conditions on the time and other parameters of events, *e.g.*, the time between performing action a and action b shall be less than ten time units; constraints on the protocol events; and invariants that shall be preserved, *e.g.*, the energy of a drone shall always be greater or equal to 35 units. The semantics of protocols is given by defining when an execution trace satisfies a protocol. This is done by extracting an event log from an execution trace, *i.e.*, relevant knowledge items accumulated in the execution trace, and checking if the event log satisfies the protocol. The latter problem is solved by mapping it to a satisfaction problem in the language of an SMT-solver.

— **Cause Diagnosis Workflow:** We propose a workflow for determining the cause of failure to satisfy a protocol. Our approach is inspired by recent work on fault ascription based on counterfactual analysis (Gössler and Stefani, 2016; Laurent et al., 2018; Gössler and Stefani, 2020). If an execution fails to satisfy a protocol the associated events determine a set of observable protocol deviations—events that violate protocol constraints or missing events. To check whether a given set of (unexpected) events causes an observed deviation, one asks "if these events had not happened, would the deviation still have occurred?" If not, then indeed the given events can be considered a cause. Otherwise there must be another set of events to blame. The workflow generates an execution log from a given SA specification including its fault models, extracts an event log from the execution log, and verifies whether there are deviations using SMT solving to check satisfaction of the protocol. If there are protocol deviations, then we carry out *gedanken* experiments. Using information about the maximal subprotocol that is satisfied, provided by the SMT solver, and the occurrences of faults identified by execution steps that deviate from the model prediction, we identify a candidate fault. The gedanken experiment re-executes the trace from the point exactly before the candidate fault happened. If the resulting execution satisfies the protocol then the candidate fault is a cause for the deviation. If not, we proceed by carrying out another *gedanken* experiment by proposing an earlier fault as candidate.

To the best of our knowledge, the proposed framework is the first executable formal model that uses such protocols to specify desired behavior of CPS and a combination of SMT constraint solving and counterfactual-like reasoning for the diagnosis of deviations. Using the proposed workflow can help design a more robust and efficient system by identifying the faults that are likely to lead to deviations.

This paper starts in Section 2 by giving an overview of the soft agents framework and the running example, called BotTeam, we will be using to illustrate our machinery. After a short introduction to rewriting logic and Maude syntax in Section 3, Section 4 describes more precisely the Soft Agents framework. The main contributions of the paper, listed above, are described in the sections that follow Section 4. Section 5 presents an extension of the soft agents framework with fault models. Section 6 defines the language for specifying protocols and its semantics, while Section 7 defines protocol deviations. Section 8 presents algorithms and a workflow for identifying causes for deviations. Section 9 describes a collection of experiments based on the BotTeam example. Finally, Sections 10 and 11 conclude by discussing related and future work.

2. Soft Agents Overview and Running Example

The soft agents (SA) framework provides an architecture and basic functions for defining executable models of SA systems. The framework is formalized in the Maude rewriting logic language (Clavel et al., 2007) and supports exploration of designs (agent strategies) and evaluation in environments with different uncertainties and forms of interference using generic fault models. Key features include

- explicit representation of both the cyber (decision making) and physical (using sensors and actuators) aspects of a soft agents CPS
- use of partially ordered knowledge items to represent state, both agent and environment
- soft constraints to support local adaptability by evaluating possible actions in the context of goals, priorities, and local sensor information.

A system configuration consists of one or more agents and one environment object. Each agent has a local knowledge base (KB). This KB can include results of observations (reading sensors), goals, priorities, and information shared by other agents. It is the knowledge an agent uses to make decisions. The environment object also has a KB. This KB is intended to model what holds in the physical world, including agent's physical state, the surrounding environment (which may include resources, obstacles, . . .), and models for physical actions (including fault models).

Two rewrite rules define the execution/operational semantics of an SA system model. The rules depend on interface functions that need to be defined for each model. The `doTask` rule executes the agent's decision making process. The `timeStep` rule executes actions proposed by the decision processes, carries out information sharing, and advances time. The `timeStep` rule also has hooks to be used for model specific instrumentation of the execution, for example recording a log or adding metadata needed to compute properties of interest.

Once model specific interface functions have been defined, the behavior specified by an initial configuration can be explored by using the rewrite command to see one possible execution, using strategy controlled rewriting to explore executions of particular interest, or using search to carry out various forms of reachability analysis.

A consequence of the separation of cyber and physical aspects, the logical model of the physical aspects can be replaced by a simulator, or potentially even by hardware as done in (Choi et al., 2013).

2.1. *BotTeam example*

We will use a simple, yet non-trivial running example, called BotTeam, to illustrate the SA machinery throughout the paper. The BotTeam case study was designed to explore simple coordination in the presence of faults. Here we describe the protocol that the agents should follow informally, and introduce the model specific components for the BotTeam. Experiments applying fault models and diagnostics will be summarized in Section 9.

The BotTeam consists of two bots with different roles, an initializer, called BotI, and a finisher, called BotF. The high-level specification of the BotTeam case study involving two bots is depicted in Figure 1. Both bots are given a set of locations that requires treatment, *e.g.*, some maintenance work. A treatment consists of a sequence of 4 treatment stages/steps, the first two done by BotI, and the last two stages by BotF.



Fig. 1. The mode automaton for the two bot classes: BotI, the initializer, an BotF, the finisher. In both cases the starting state is the ready state.

More precisely, BotI starts in the ready mode. It moves to mode enroute(tgt) by selecting one location target, tgt, that needs treatment. Once the target location is reached, BotI moves to treat mode and carries out the first two stages of the treatment. When all target locations are treated, BotI enters the mode enroute(home), heads back to the home station and once reached enters mode done. BotF follows the same modes of operation as BotI. A difference is that BotF requires supplies in order to carry out its treatments. Therefore, whenever the supply is low, then BotF returns to the depot to re-supply. We also assume, not explicitly shown in the mode automaton, that the bots also divert to the charging station whenever their battery level reaches da angerously low level.

Examples of protocol deviations that can be formalized using our machinery include:

— **Wrong Order Treatment Deviation:** BotF carries out a treatment on a target that was not previously treated by BotI;
— **Delay Between Treatment Deviation:** BotI and BotF treat a target at times t_I and t_F, respectively, such that $t_F > t_I + \Delta$, for some $\Delta > 0$, *i.e.*, BotF treated a target too late.
— **Treatment without Supply Deviation:** BotF attempts a treatment without actually having the necessary supplies.
— **Low Energy Deviation:** BotI or BotF have energy too low to enable them to return to the charging station to re-charge.

Notice that deviations may involve timing aspects, as in **Delay Between Treatment Deviation**, or quantitative values, as in **Low Energy Deviation** and **Treatment without Supply Deviation**. In the following we will focus on delay and energy deviations.

To carry out the assigned task of treating target and avoid deviations, the bots make use of their sensors. We assume that each bot has the following sensors: *Location Sensor:* This sensor reports the location of the bot. *Energy Sensor:* This sensor reports the current energy level of the bot. *Supply Sensor:* This sensor reports the current level of supplies available. (This is only used by BotF.) *Treatment Sensor:* This sensor reports whether a target has been treated and up to which stage. *Obstacle Sensor:* This sensor reports locations of obstacles if any, *e.g.*, a bot at an adjacent/close location. These sensors may be faulty. For example, the location sensor may provide a location reading that does not correspond to the actual location of a bot. This means

that the information used by bot to decide how to act may be incorrect and therefore, the bot does not act as specified by the expected behavior, resulting in a *deviation*.

3. Rewriting Logic and Maude

The soft-agents framework as well as the detection and diagnosis machinery is specified in Rewriting Logic (Meseguer, 1992; Meseguer, 2012) and implemented in Maude (Clavel et al., 2007). We review and illustrate Rewriting Logic and Maude next.

Rewriting logic is a logical formalism that is based on two simple ideas: i) states of a system are represented as elements of an algebraic data type, specified in an equational theory, and ii) the behavior of a system is specified by local transitions between states described by *rewrite rules*. An equational theory specifies data types by declaring constants and constructor operations that build complex structured data from simpler parts. Mathematical structures such as sets and maps can be represented directly by declaring, using axioms, that the constructors are associative and commutative, and naming the identity element. Functions on the specified data types are defined by *equations* that allow the result of applying the function to be computed. A *term* is a variable, a constant, or the application of a constructor or function symbol to a list of terms.

A rewrite rule has the form $t \Rightarrow t' \ if \ c$, where t and t' are terms possibly containing variables and c is a condition (a Boolean term). For a system in state s, such a rule is enabled if t can be matched to a part of s by supplying the right values for the variables (using a matching substitution), and if the condition c holds when supplied with those values. In this case the rule can be applied by replacing the part of s matching t by t' using the matching values for the place holders in t'. The process of application of rewrite rules generates computations (and traces).

Maude is both a language and tool based on rewriting logic (Clavel et al., 2007; Maude-Team, 2021). Maude provides a high performance rewriting engine featuring matching modulo associativity, commutativity, identity axioms, and search and model-checking capabilities. Thus, given a specification S of a concurrent system, a user can execute S, using one of Maude's built-in rewriting strategies, to find one possible behavior; use search to see if a state meeting a given condition can be reached; or model-check S to see if a temporal property is satisfied, and if not to see a counter-example computation. Maude also supports reflection with a simple representation of modules and their components, and access to key functions of the core Maude system that allow the user to specify execution and search strategies and module transformation.

We introduce the syntax of Maude with a simple example with a bot moving on a grid. Firstly, we define the sorts as follows:

```
sorts Bot Bot? .
subsort Bot < Bot? .
```

In particular, the first line specifies two sorts `Bot` and `Bot?` and the second line specifies that `Bot` is a subsort of `Bot?`. ‡

We use operators to populate these sorts as follows:

```
op noB : -> Bot?  [ctor] .
ops B0 B1 : -> Bot [ctor] .
```

‡ The use of `?` at the end of a sort name is a convention that indicates an error sort.

where noB denotes the absence of a Bot, while B0 and B1 are two bot names.

Similarly, we can define square(s) (of the grid) as follows:

```
sorts Square Squares  .
subsort Square < Squares .
op sq : Nat Nat Bot? -> Square [ctor] .
op none : -> Squares [ctor] .
op __ : Squares Squares -> Squares
        [ctor comm assoc id: none] .
```

Notice the keywords comm, assoc and id:. They denote that an operator is commutative and associative, with identity none. Thus Squares is a multiset of elements of sort Square.[§] Based on these sorts and operators, we can define a scenario with one bot on a 3×3 grid as follows:

```
op scenario : -> Squares .
eq scenario =
  sq(0,0,B0) sq(0,1,noB) sq(0,2,noB)
  sq(1,0,noB) sq(1,1,noB) sq(1,2,noB)
  sq(2,0,noB) sq(2,1,noB) sq(2,2,noB) .
```

where scenario denotes that bot B0 is at position (0,0) and the remaining locations are empty.

So far we have used an equational theory to define the datatypes used by rewrite rules. The following is an example of a conditional rewrite rule:

```
crl[mv]:
  sq(i0,j0,b:Bot) sq(i1,j1,noB) => sq(i0,j0,noB) sq(i1,j1,b:Bot)
  if ((i1 == s i0) or (i0 == s i1)  or
      (j1 == s j0) or (j0 == s j1) ) .
```

This rule specifies that a bot at any position (i0,j0) can move to upwards, downwards, to the left or right, as long at it it remains on the board. This is specified by the conditions of the rule where s is the successor function.

With the specification above, we can use Maude's search engine to check for reachability properties. For example, the following command

```
search [1] scenario =>+ sqs:Squares sq(2,2,B0) .
```

checks whether the bot B0 can reach the position (2,2). Maude reports a solution where position (0,0) is now empty (noB) and B0 is indeed at position (2,2).

For more details on Maude and Rewriting Logic, we refer the interested reader to (Clavel et al., 2007).

4. Soft Agents Framework

We will use the BotTeam scenario to illustrate key elements of the soft agents formalization in Maude. The basic soft agents framework is described in more detail in (Talcott et al., 2016) and the technical report accompanying the code (Kim et al., 2019).

[§] The underscores are argument placeholders, used when there is not explicit operator. This is known as *empty syntax*.

4.1. *Basic Sorts and Functions*

Soft agents uses the following basic sorts:

`Id` is the sort of identifiers, used to identify agents, and other objects. Each model is responsible for defining its own `Id` constructors. The BotTeam `Id` constructors are: `b(i:Nat)` (bots), `st(i:Nat)` (stations), `dp(i:Nat)` (depots) and `ob(i:Nat)` (obstacles). A constant `eI` of sort `Id` is declared to name the unique environment object in a system configuration.

`Time` is the sort used to represent time. The soft agents framework provides a variety of Time modules to choose from, including discrete (natural numbers) or dense (rationals or reals) time representations. In the current soft agents framework instances we use discrete time represented using the sort `Nat` of natural numbers.

The sort `Loc` is an interface sort at the framework level. There is a constant `noLoc` indicating an unknown location. In the Bot example locations are points on a two dimensional grid using the following sorts and constructors:

```
sort Pt2 .  subsort Pt2 < Loc .   op pt : Nat Nat -> Pt2 [ctor] .
```

For example, `pt(2,1)` specifies the location (2,1) on a two dimensional grid.

`Class` is the sort of object classes.

A KB (sort `KB`) is a set of knowledge items (sort `KItem`). There are two (sub)sorts of knowledge items, persistent (sort `PKItem`) and transient (sort `TKItem`). Transient knowledge items are time stamped information items of the form `info:Info @ t:Time` where terms `info:Info` are expected to have parameters that change over time. Persistent knowledge items model properties that do not vary over time and thus are not time stamped. There is a distinguished knowledge item `clock(t:Time)` that represents the current time. For example `clock(10)` represents that `10` time units have passed since the starting time `0`. There are two additional builtin knowledge item terms. `class(id:Id,cl:Class)` says that the class of the entity (agent or other object) with identifier `id:Id` is `cl:Class`. It has sort `PKItem` as the class is not expected to change. For example `class(b(0),BotI)` says that the entity with identifier `b(0)` is an initializer bot, `BotI`. The term `atloc(id:Id,l:Loc) @ t:Time` denotes that the entity with identifier `id:Id` is at location `l:Loc` at time `t:Time`. It has sort `TKItem` since in the case of a mobile entity `l:Loc` changes as the agent moves.

The *local knowledge base* (`lkb`) of a particular agent and the *environment knowledge base* (`ekb`) are of the sort `KB`. The former specifies the agent's view of the world, obtained from its possibly faulty sensors, while the latter is the actual specification of the world.

We classify as *background knowledge* the items in a knowledge base that specify the general conditions of the scenario. Typically the background knowledge contains data that does not change, *e.g.*, the types of agents, the locations of stations.

Example 4.1. The following local knowledge base of the initializer, `lkbI`, specifies that its `Id` is `b(0)`, it is at location (0,1); the station `st(0)` is at the location (3,2); its energy is `100` units; it is in mode ready.

```
lkbI = clock(0) class(b(0),BotI) class(st(0),Station) (atloc(b(0),pt(0,1)) @ 0)
  (atloc(st(0),pt(3,2)) @ 0)(mode(b(0),ready) @ 0) (energy(b(0), 100) @ 0)
  (ereserve(b(0),35) @ 0) home(b(0),pt(0,1)) (targets(pt(4, 0) ; pt(5, 4)) @ 0)
   (fence (b(0),pt(0,0),pt(6,5)) @ 0)
```

The KItem `(mode(b(0),ready) @ 0)` specifies that the bot is ready for carrying out the tasks assigned, namely, visit the points in `(targets(pt(4, 0) ; pt(5, 4)) @ 0)`. The background knowledge of `b(0)` is:

```
class(st(0),Station) (atloc(st(0),pt(3,2)) @ 0)class(b(0),BotI)
home(b(0),pt(0,1)) (fence (b(0),pt(0,0),pt(6,5)) @ 0) (ereserve(b(0),35) @ 0)
```

The KItem `(ereserve(b(0),35) @ 0)` is a parameter used by the soft constraint solving mechanism to cause a Bot to pass by the charging station before its energy level gets too low. It is part of the scenario specification rather than representing state that evolves over time, and thus background knowledge. The `(targets(pt(4,0) ; pt(5,4)) @ 0)` KItem is the list of locations to be visited. When a target is selected it is removed from the list and made the current target. When there are no more targets and the current target has been treated, the Bot goes home using the `home(b(0),pt(0,1))` KItem to remember where that is.

Elements of the sort `Sensor` name sensors available to an agent. The Bot sensors described in Section 2 are associated to the constants `locS`, `energyS`, `obstacleS`, and `treatS` respectively. The finisher Bot also has a supply level sensor with associated constant `supplyS`.

The sort `Task` represents tasks to be carried out by agents. Task events are executed by the `doTask` rule. In our case studies only one task is used, namely `tick`. It is used to schedule the next time the agent reads its sensors and proposes actions.

Events are used to determine what happens during rule application. The sort `Event` has two subsorts: `DEvents` that are actions (sort `Action`) or tasks (sort `Task`) with delays, and `IEvents` that are events to be processed immediately (implicit delay of 0).

The sort `Action` is used to describe actions proposed by agents. Each action has an identifier parameter that identifies the agent carrying out the action, and possibly other parameters. Each action consumes resources, such as energy, which are specified by the operational semantics of the scenario described in Section 4.2.

Example 4.2. The actions available to BotTeam agents are

— `charge(id:Id)` increases energy level provided the bot is at the supply depot.
— `mv(id:Id,dir:Pt2)` moves one unit in the direction specified by the vector `dir:Pt2`.
— `treat(id:Id)` increments treatment stage by 1. For `BotF` the execution of this action uses some of the supply.
— `load(id:Id)` available to `BotF` at the supply depot to replenish its supply.

To decide its next action, an agent ranks each applicable action in its current local knowledge base according to the agent's preference specified using soft-constraints (Bistarelli et al., 1997). The result is a set of *ranked actions*, `ract`, which are pairs of the form `{rval,act}`, where `act` is the action and `rval` is the action's valuation, typically a value in the interval [0,1], where 1 is more preferred.

4.2. *Soft Agents Semantics: Configuration and Rules*

A soft agents configuration (sort `Conf`) is a multiset of configuration elements (sort `ConfElt`). Agent objects (sort `Agent`) and environment objects (sort `Env`) are configuration elements. For-

mally `Agent` and `Env` are subsorts of `ConfElt`. A well-formed configuration needs a unique environment object and at least one agent object. Other configuration elements can be defined to control execution, and to track properties of interest. Logs and bounds on the time or number of applications of selected rewrite rules are examples of other configuration elements as we will see later. Configurations are *open ended* as you can add or remove an element and still have a configuration. A soft agents system `{ conf:Conf }` (sort `ASystem`) specifies exactly which configuration elements are present by enclosing them in `{}`s. The use of `ASystem` is required when a rewrite rule needs to know it has all elements of a configuration under consideration, in contrast to rules that operate on one or a pair of configuration elements.

An agent object has the form `[id:Id : cl:Class | attrs:AttributeSet]` where an attribute is a key-value pair. Agent objects must have at least the following attributes: `lkb : localkb:KB`, the agent's local KB; `sensors : ss:SensorSet`, the agent's sensors `evs : events:Events`, events awaiting processing `ckb : cachedkb:KB`, cached knowledge to be shared.

Example 4.3. The following is an example of an Agent Object for the `BotI` class where `lkbI` is taken from Example 4.1 and the sensors are as described in Section 4.1

```
[b(0) : BotI | lkb : lkbI, ckb : none,
               sensors : (locS obstacleS energyS treatS), evs : (tick @ 0)]
```

An environment object has the form `[eid:Id | ekb:KB]` The environment KB (`ekb:KB`) contains information about the physical state of each agent such as location and energy, information about resources such as location of charging stations, information about obstacles, global parameters such as communication range, and fault models. The environment KB and each agent local KB contain a clock knowledge item.

The semantics of an soft agents configuration is defined by two rewrite rules: `doTask` and `timestep` described in the following.

4.2.1. *Rule doTask* The `doTask` rule applies to sub-configurations involving a single agent object as it has no need to know all the configuration elements of a system. Formally, this rule applies to any agent with a task that has 0 delay (`(task @ 0)`) as specified below: ¶

```
crl[doTask]:
 [id : cl | lkb : lkb, evs : ((task @ 0) evs), ckb : ckb, sensors : sset, ats]
 [eid | ekb]
=> [id : cl | lkb : lkb', evs : evs', ckb : ckb', sensors : sset, ats]
 [eid | ekb']
  if t := getTime(lkb)
  /\ {ievs,devs} := splitEvents(evs,none)
  /\ {skb,ekb'} := readSensors(id,sset,ekb)
  /\ kekset := doTask(cl,id,task,ievs,devs,skb,lkb)
  /\ {lkb', evs', kb} kekset0 := selectKeK(lkb,kekset)
  /\ ckb' := addK(ckb,kb) .
```

The `doTask` rule uses the following functions:

`splitEvents` splits its first argument into two sets, the immediate events `ievs` and the

¶ The operator `:=` used in the rule condition is a matching assignment operator. The right hand side is evaluated using the rules matching substitution and the result used to bind the variables on the left hand side pattern by matching.

events with delays `devs`. The agent processes `ievs`. It may modify `devs`, but usually just adds new tasks and/or actions.

`readSensors` returns the union `skb` of the result of reading each sensor in `sset` independently, together with an updated environment. To read a single sensor, the sensor knowledge is retrieved from the environment KB along with a fault model for that sensor, if any. If there is no fault model, the sensor knowledge is returned. If there is a fault model, it is applied using `applySensorF(id,s:Sensor,skb0,fkb,ekb)` where `skb0` is the sensor knowledge and `fkb` is the fault model. The environment update is an artifact of how fault models are applied using Maude's random number generator. Fault models and their application are discussed in Section 5. As an example the knowledge associated to the location sensor `locS` of a Bot with identifier `b(0)` has the form `atloc(b(0),loc:Loc) @ t:Time`.

The `doTask` function specifies the possible actions that the agent is willing to do, given its current set of tasks, events (immediate and delayed), sensed information, and local knowledge base. It returns a set of triples of the form `{lkb',evs',kb}` where `lkb'` is the agent's new local KB, `evs'` updates the pending events, and `kb` is new information to share. The set arises because there maybe more than one choice of action that the soft constraint solver views as acceptable.

Example 4.4. For example, the `doTask` rule applied to the agent object described in Example 4.3 (and the corresponding environment object) results in the Bot `b(0)` updating its `evs` to `(tick @ 1) ({{cv(100),u(1)},mv(b(0), pt(1, 0))} @ 0)` specifying that the bot decided to move north with the highest preference `{cv(100),u(1)}`. This is achieved by first determining using `splitEvents` the immediate events and the delayed events. In this example, there is only the immediate event `tick @ 0` and no delayed event. Then the function `readSensors` probes the environment knowledge base using the sensors `(locS obstacleS energyS treatS)`. This means that the variable `skb` in the `doTask` rule contains the new location, obstacles, energy and treated knowledge (with errors introduced by fault models). The the function `doTask` evaluates which action to take, which in this case is to move north.‖

4.2.2. *Rule timeStep* Intuitively, the `timeStep` rule advances time carrying out the actions that have been decided by each agent as specified by the `doTask` rule. So it is only applicable when `doTask` is no longer applicable. Since the rule needs to know all configuration elements it applies to systems, `{ aconf }` as specified below:

```
crl[timeStep]: { aconf } => { aconf2 }
 if nzt := mte(aconf)
 /\ t := getTime(envKB(aconf))
 /\ evs := effActs(aconf)
 /\ ekb0 := doEnvAct(t,nzt,envKB(aconf),evs)
 /\ ekb' := resolveKB(getEnvId(aconf),ekb0,envKB(aconf))
 /\ aconf0 := updateEnv(ekb',timeEffect(aconf,nzt))
 /\ aconf1 := shareKnowledge(aconf0)
 /\ aconf3 := updateLog(aconf1,t,nzt,evs)
```

‖ The preference measure is a lexicographic ordering of energy consideration, `cv(100)`, and making progress in the current task, `u(1)`.

```
 /\ aconf2 := updateConf(aconf3) .
```

where `mte` computes the time of the next scheduled task. So when it returns a non-zero time, it means that `doTask` is not applicable.

`effActs(aconf)` computes the set of action events in each agents `evs` attribute.

Actions in `evs` are carried out *concurrently* by `doEnvAct(t,nzt,envKB(aconf),evs)`, producing updates for the environment KB. This function also implements action faults discussed in Section 5.

Example 4.5. When `doEnvAct` is applied to the events shown in Example 4.4 it returns an `ekb'` where the position of the `b(0)` is `(atloc(b(0),pt(1,1)) @ 1)`, instead of the position `(atloc(b(0),pt(0,1)) @ 0)`. That is the agent moves north.

`resolveKB(getEnvId(aconf),ekb0,envKB(aconf))` produces a consistent global update. In the current models, the only conflicts are when two or more agents want to move to the same position. This is resolved by choosing one of the agents to succeed, the others must stay where they started. [††]

`timeEffect(aconf,nzt)` advances time in the configuration `aconf` by `nzt`, and the environment KB in the resulting configuration is updated using the function `updateEnv` and `ekb'`.

`shareKnowledge` is used to enable the communication between agents. It considers the `ckb` attributes for each pair of agents that are within the model's communication distance, computes what is new from each agent's perspective, updates the caches, and adds `rcv(newkb)` to the agent's `evs` attribute.

`updateLog` and `updateConf`, are hooks to allow for instrumenting configurations. Execution logs are a common form of instrumenting executions. The soft agents framework provides a data structure and parametric procedure to collect log information. A log (sort `Log`) is a sequence of log items with elements of the sequence separated by `;`. In our case studies where the time to pass (`nzt`) is 1, `updateLog(aconf1,t,1,evs)` returns `aconf1` if `aconf1` has no log element. Otherwise it adds to the log a logitem `{t:Time,acts,lconf:Conf}` where `acts` is the actions with delay 0 in `evs` and `lconf` is computed by the interface function `kblog(aconf1,none)` (the `none` is the initial value of the configuration element accumulator).

The default for `updateConf` is to return its argument unchanged. The soft agents framework provides a configuration element `bound(n:Nat)` to limit the number of `timeStep` rule applications.

4.3. *Executions*

Using the two rewrite rules, `doTask` and `timeStep`, executions of a soft agents system alternate steps where agents observe (read their sensors) and decide on actions, and steps where the

[††] The rationale for the one agent wins when there is a conflict is that it is very unlikely that two or more agents arrive at the same place at exactly the same time, and we choose randomly in each case which one arrived first. Even if agents negotiated sharing of space, environmental perturbations might lead to failure of the resulting plans. Agents are moving slowly and colliding is not an disasterous.

actions are realized by the environment. Assuming a set of agents, $a_1, \ldots, a_n$, an *execution step* is a sequence of transition segments of the form

$$\mathcal{C}_0 \longrightarrow [\texttt{doTask}(a_1)]\, \mathcal{C}_1 \longrightarrow [\texttt{doTask}(a_2)]\ \cdots \longrightarrow [\texttt{doTask}(a_n)]\, \mathcal{C}_n \longrightarrow [\texttt{timestep}]\, \mathcal{C}'$$

with a sequence of applications of $\texttt{doTask}(a_i)$ applied to an agent $a_i \in \{a_1, \ldots, a_n\}$ followed by an instance of the `timestep` rule. We will abbreviate any such sequence as

$$\mathcal{C}_0 \longrightarrow [\texttt{doTask}]\, \mathcal{C}_n \longrightarrow [\texttt{timestep}]\, \mathcal{C}'.$$

An *execution trace* is a sequence of execution steps.

The Maude implementation of the soft agents framework, case studies, sample output of executions and searches, and documentation is available at

`github.com/SRI-CSL/SoftAgentsDiagnosis.git`.

It is possible to use Maude rewriting and search machinery to carry out experiments and analysis.

Example 4.6 (Using search to check energy level compliance). We illustrate using the search capability to look for situations in which the BotTeam fails to meet the energy caution invariant: a bots energy should not go below 35%. In the case of two targets to maintain and no faults the initial state is described by the term `mkInitS(pt(4, 0) ; pt(5, 4), true).` The command to search for one example of non compliance by the finisher bot `b(1)` is

```
search [1] mkInitS(pt(4, 0) ; pt(5, 4), true) =>+
   {aconf:Conf [eI | ekb:KB ]} such that getEnergy(b(1),ekb:KB) < 35 .
```

and the result is `No solution`. This means that in the absense of faults, the energy of `b(1)` is not lower than 35.

5. Fault Models

This section introduces a general mechanism, called *fault models*, for adding faults to a soft agents system model. The fault models serve two purposes. One purpose is to provide a setting for developing detection and diagnosis methods. Another purpose is to support exploring the design space for soft agents behavior in terms of resilience and adaptability in the presence of imperfect sensors and actuators and unpredictable environment perturbations. There are two kinds of fault, sensor faults and action faults, which we describe in the following. Environment perturbations such as obstacles are modeled as knowledge items in the environment KB. Suitable sensors are needed to detect these perturbations, which can be faulty.

There are three sorts used to parameterize fault models: `FType`, `FVal`, and `FPars`.

`FType` is the sort of fault types. The soft agents framework currently provides two sensor fault types: a boolean fault type, `boolFT`, a fault that is either present or not; and a simple fault type, `simpleFT`, with fault effect parameterized by elements of sort `FPars`. `FVal` provides a super sort for collecting parameters with different structures.

The parameters for a fault of type `boolFT` are terms of sort `FPars` of the form `bFP(bp:Rat)` where `bp:Rat` specifies the probability of a fault. The parameters for a fault of type `simpleFT` are terms of sort `FPars` of the form `sFP(fp0:Rat,fp1:Rat,fv:FVal)`. The two rational arguments, `fp0:Rat,fp1:Rat`, are typically used as probability thresholds, such as, determining if a sensor is broken (no reading) or not, and if not broken whether there is a reading

error. The `FVal` argument is an interface sort. Each soft agents model and sensor will have its own subsorts.

Sensor faults can model imprecision of sensors, broken sensors, environmental interference such as mud on a camera or interference with a GPS signal. A sensor fault is specified by a term of sort `Info` of the form `sF(id:Id,s:Sensor,ft:FType,fp:FPars)` where `id:Id` is the identifier of the agent whose sensor `s:Sensor` is faulty.

Example 5.1. The term `sF(b(0),locS,simpleFT,sFP(1/10,1/5,ptV(pt(0,1))))` specifies a simple location sensor fault for Bot `b(0)`. With probability $1/10$ the sensor gives no reading (`noLoc`) and if it gives a reading, the reading is off by 1 unit north with probability $1/5$. The meaning of the fault term is given by the `readSensors` function.

The interpretation of a sensor fault model is defined by the function

`applySensorF(id:Id,s:Sensor,skb:KB,fm:KB,ekb:KB)`

which is invoked by the `readSensor` function as described in Section 4.2.1. `id:Id` is the identifier of the agent reading its sensors, `s:Sensor` is the sensor being read, `skb:KB` is the sensor information in the absence of faults `fm:KB` is the fault model to apply, and `ekb:KB` is the environment KB where the sensor is being read. The result is a pair of KBs, the faulty sensor knowledge and the updated environment KB. `applySensorF` uses Maude's builtin randon number sequence generator to sample the various fault probablility distributions. Each agents is allocated a subsequence and the environment KB records the agent's position in its subsequence. The updated environment KB records the new random sequence positions for each agent.

Action faults can be used to model action imprecision or failure, environmental interference such as wind blowing a drone or a steep hill reducing the effectiveness of a move action. Similar to sensors, we need names for action types. The sort `Act` is the sort of action (type) names. In the BotTeam example the names are `mvA` (move action), `chargeA` (charge action), `treatA` (treat action), and `loadA` (load action, for the finisher bot). Similar to sensor faults, an action fault is specified by terms `aF(id:Id,a:Act,ft:FType,fp:FPars)` of sort `Info`.

Example 5.2. `aF(b(0),mvA,simpleFT,sFP(1/10,1/10,ptV(pt(-1,0))))` specifies a move action fault for Bot `b(0)` with probability $1/10$ of a broken actuator (no move), probability $1/10$ of a faulty move, if the actuator is not broken, with error given by the vector `pt(-1,0)`.

As discussed in Section 4.2.2, the interpretation of an action fault model is defined by the `doEAct` function. It returns an update to the environment KB that may include execution deviations. The occurrence of such deviation depends on the probability distributions specified by the given fault-models.

6. Protocols: Formal Behavior Requirements

In order to detect when something goes wrong in an SA system, one needs to know what is right. Furthermore, to find the cause when a goal is not achieved or a requirement/invariant is not satisfied it helps to have some idea of the steps expected to lead to success, for example a mission plan. To identify where in the mission plan things went wrong it is important to have a formal

representation of the plan and its constraints. Correct execution of a mission plan may achieve higher level goals, but that is not the issue being addressed here. It might be possible to encode relevant features of a mission plan in a temporal logic. We felt that a direct formalization would be simpler, and easier to understand and validate.

Inspired by rules for carrying out scientific experiments and clinical trials (Kanovich et al., 2017), we propose the notion of soft agents protocol to specify desired/required behavior of a soft agents system. Intuitively, a protocol specifies a finite mission as in the BotTeam example described in Section 2. In particular, a protocol specifies observable events that should take place (stages or steps making progress) along with any ordering or timing conditions and possibly other conditions. To allow for flexibility and avoid specifying values, such as exact times, a protocol consists of a set of observable event patterns and constraints expressed in terms of pattern variables, together with invariant constraints (defining what is called adverse events in clinical trials).

Given a protocol, we associate notion of compliance or satisfaction—when does an execution of a soft agents system meet the requirements specified by that protocol. Using the intuition above, the idea is to match protocol event patterns to observable events of the execution and then check that the instantiated constraints hold.

Intuitively, protocol specifications are artifacts produced between system specification, *e.g.*, expressed as Linear Temporal Logic (Pnueli, 1977) formulas, and the development of executable models, such as those using SA framework. The purpose of protocols is to enable analysis of how things may go wrong based on fault models and the executable models as we detail in Section 7.

6.1. *SA Protocols*

A soft agents protocol is a finite partial order of observable event patterns together with constraints on the pattern variables and possibly additional invariant constraints independent of the event pattern variables. Using event patterns rather than concrete events allows for compact specification and also for specifications that can be met under many conditions. For example, there is no need to specify concrete times for events, when relative times and time intervals are what is important; one may not want to specify precise locations, but only neighborhoods; and in some cases, the order between a pair of events may not matter as long as both happen.

Soft agents event patterns are represented by symbolic knowledge items, *i.e.*, time stamped information items where the time stamps are variables, and the parameters of the information part may be variables. The partial order is specified by ordering relations on the time stamp variables. We require that each event has a unique symbolic time stamp. Thus, a symbolic event can be identified by its time stamp and so multiple occurrences of the same information template can be distinguished. Invariants are typically used to represent safety envelopes, such as maintaining energy above a given minimum level or ensuring that the distance between pairs of agents is greater than a given minimum.

Definition 6.1 (SA Protocol). For a system with agents whose identifiers are the elements of `AgentIds`, a (soft agent) protocol $\mathcal{P}$ is a tuple $(TL, Eps, LO, GO, CS, Inv)$ where

— TL is a list of timelines, where the timeline for an agent is the list of time stamp variables for events under control of that agent.

— Eps is the set of protocol event patterns.
— LO is the set of local order constraints for each agent. A local order constraint for an agent has the form `s0:Time < s1:Time` where `s0:Time`, `s1:Time` are time stamp variables in the timeline for that agent.
— GO is the set of global order constraints, `s0:Time < s1:Time` where `s0:Time`, `s1:Time` belong to the timelines of different agents.
— CS consists of additional constraints on protocol event pattern variables.
— Inv is the set of invariant constraints. These are implications `epats => c` where `epats` is a list of event pattern viewed as a conjunction, `c` is a constraint on the variables of the event patterns in `epats`.

Example 6.2 (BotTeam Protocol). We describe protocol elements for bot `b(0)` (Initiator) as introduced in Section 2. Its timeline is:

```
timeline(b(0),s00:Time,s01:Time,s02:Time,s03:Time,s04:Time,s05:Time)
```

The time stamp variables are used in the event pattern:

```
atloc(b(0),pt(4, 0)) @ s00:Time treatStage(pt(4, 0),2) @ s01:Time
atloc(b(0),l0:Pt2) @ s02:Time atloc(b(0),pt(5, 4)) @ s03:Time
treatStage(pt(5, 4),2) @ s04:Time atloc(b(0),l1:Pt2) @ s05:Time
```

This pattern specifies the events to be carried out by the bot, namely, the locations `b(0)` to be visited and the treatments to be applied.

Local order constraints specify temporal conditions for the protocol. The following local ordering constraint specifies that the timestamps of the events in the pattern above shall form a total order, *i.e.*, one event is followed by the next one.

```
s00:Time < s01:Time  s01:Time < s02:Time s02:Time < s03:Time
s03:Time < s04:Time  s04:Time < s05:Time
```

The local ordering `s03:Time - s01:Time < 15` specifies that the bot shall not take too long to reach the second location once the second treatment of the first location is completed.

Global order constraints can specify timing conditions involving multiple agents. For example, `treatStage(pt(4, 0),4) @ s11:Time` is in the event patterns of bot `b(1)`, and the global order constraint `s11:Time - s01:Time < 10` specifies that the time between treatments shall not exceed 10 time units.

The following invariant specifies that the energy levels of the bot shall always be greater than 35 time units: `energy(id:Id,e:Nat) @ s:Time => e >= 35`

The design of the protocol language has been carefully crafted to enable the development of automated workflows using SMT-solvers and Maude. While we believe that it is possible to extend the language with other constructs such as finite branching and finite unfolding, unbounded recursion will likely lead to undecidability of the diagnosis problem, or to problems that current SMT implementations cannot check satisfiability.

Typically in an execution of the protocol the local order for an agent is a total-order. The order need not be totally specified, meaning that multiple orders are acceptable. Some actions

may cause change in more than one observable and hence the corresponding events will appear simultaneously.

6.2. *Protocol Satisfaction by Event Logs*

Not all knowledge items make sense as events. The realization of a protocol event is the result of an agent action, that is it is among the knowledge items returned by `doAct` or `envAct`. In particular, for the agents to execute the protocol these events should be under the control of the agents, not environment actions. In the case of the BotTeam protocol events are location, treatment stage and energy knowledge items. If the bots had cameras, knowledge items relevant to taking pictures could be protocol events.

We define the event language, EL, of a protocol to be the knowledge items generated by the information constructors used in the event patterns appearing in the protocol (both the partial order and the invariants). This language is specified by a sub-signature of the Maude `KB` signature. For example, the event language of the BotTeam above is given by the constructors

```
atloc : Id Loc -> Info  treatStage : Loc Nat -> Info  energy : Id Nat -> Info
```

Definition 6.3 (Event Log). An event log, EvL, over a given event language and `AgentIds` is a concrete set of events, i.e., ground knowledge terms whose information component is in the given language and whose agent identifiers are in `AgentIds`.

Definition 6.4 (Satisfaction by Event Log). Let $\mathcal{P} = (TL, Eps, LO, GO, CS, Inv)$ be a protocol for `AgentIds` with event language, EL. Let EvL be an event log over `AgentIds` and EL. EvL satisfies $\mathcal{P}$ ($EvL \models \mathcal{P}$) is defined as follows:

— $EvL \models \mathcal{P}$ if and only if $EvL \models (Eps, LO, GO, CS)$ and $EvL \models Inv$.
— $EvL \models (Eps, LO, GO, CS)$ if and only if there is a substitution, σ, embedding Eps in EvL ($\sigma(Eps) \subseteq EvL$) such that $\sigma(LO)$, $\sigma(GO)$, $\sigma(CS)$ are all true.
— $EvL \models Inv$ if and only if $EvL \models$ `ep => c` for each invariant expression `ep => c` in Inv.
— $EvL \models$ `ep => c` if and only if for each instance $\sigma_0($`ep`$)$ in EvL, $\sigma_0($`c`$)$ is true.

Example 6.5. For example, running the BotTeam example in Maude, we obtain an event log of the following form:

```
(atloc(b(0), pt(0,0)) @ 1) ... atloc(b(0), pt(5,4)) @ 20)
(treatStage(pt(4,0), 2) @ 9) ... (treatStage(pt(4,0), 4) @ 15)
(treatStage(pt(5,4), 2) @ 28) ... (treatStage(pt(5,4), 4) @ 34)
((energy(b(0), 100) @ 1)) ... (energy(b(0), 60) @ 34)
```

The first line contains the events with positions of `b(0)` during the execution, while the following two lines contains the treatment events for the two treatment points. The last line contains the bot's energy levels. This event log satisfies the local constraint `s03:Time - s01:Time < 15` described in Example 6.2. Indeed, the time of completion of the second treatment of the location `pt(4,0)` is nine, *i.e.*, the value `s01:Time` is nine. Moreover, the time `b(0)` reached and the second point was 20, *i.e.*, the value of `s03:Time` is 20. Thus the constraint `s03:Time - s01:Time < 15` is true as $20 - 9 = 11 < 15$.

6.3. *Protocol Satisfaction by Execution Traces*

In Section 4.2.2, a generic mechanism for collecting execution logs was described. Here we consider logs appropriate for checking satisfaction and detecting deviations from a protocol and derive event logs from these execution logs.

Recall that a log item has the form `{t, acts,lconf}` where `t` is a time stamp, `acts` an action set, and `lconf` a set of configuration elements. `t` is the time just before the actions are carried out. A log Lg is a sequence of log items with time increasing. We write $len(Lg)$ for the length of the sequence. Define $Lg[t]$ to be the (unique) log item of Lg with time stamp `t`, *i.e.*, the log item of the form `{t, acts, lconf}`. $Lg[t]$ is `nil` if there is no such log item. Note that the logs generated by `updateLog` have a log item for each time from 0 up to (not including) the length of the log.

Here we restrict our attention to logged configurations `lconf` that have the form `[eid | ekbl] ... [id : Cl | lkb : lkbl] ...` In particular, only the `lkb` attribute of agents is kept. How much of the execution configuration KBs to keep in the log depends on the intended use. If one is only checking protocol satisfaction, then only the knowledge items in the protocol event language are needed. For detecting deviations or diagnosis more information is usually needed. For checking properties other than protocol satisfaction, log items might collect metadata rather than environment and agent knowledge.

We introduce some auxiliary notation used to define the notion of "log for a trace" and satisfaction relations between protocols and traces or logs. In the following Tr is an execution trace as defined in Section 4.3 and Lg is a log. For j from 0 up to (not including) $len(Tr)$, $Tr[j]$ is the jth execution step of Tr: $\mathcal{C}_j \longrightarrow$ [`doTask`] $\mathcal{C}'_j \longrightarrow$ [`timestep`] $\mathcal{C}_{j+1}$. Moreover, let `acts.j` be the actions carried out in the above `timestep` rule. Notice that j is the time t in $\mathcal{C}_j$, and $j+1$ is the time in $\mathcal{C}_{j+1}$ and we also write $Tr[t]$ for this trace element. For t a timestamp of Lg, $Lg[t]$ is `{t,acts,lconf}` where `lconf` has the form

```
[eid | ekbl] ... [id : Cl | lkb : lkbl.id] ...
```

We define the following notation: $Lg[t][eid]$ = `ekbl`, $Lg[t][id]$ = `lkbl.id`, $Lg[t][a]$ = `acts` and letting `[eid | ekb] ... [id : cl | lkb: lkb.id ...] ...` be the final configuration `C.j+1` of $Tr[j]$ where $j = t$ above, then $Tr[t][eid]$ = `ekb`, $Tr[t][id]$ = `lkb.id`, $Tr[t][a]$ = `acts.j`.

Definition 6.6 (Trace and Logs). Let `AgentIds` be the identifiers of agents in the initial configuration of Tr (and hence of each configuration of Tr).

— A log Lg is a log for Tr if $Lg[j]$ is a log item for $Tr[j]$ for j a time stamp of Lg.

— $Lg[t]$ is a log item for $Tr[t]$ if and only if the following conditions are satisfied

- $Lg[t][eid]$ is a subset of $Tr[t][eid]$
- $Lg[t][id]$ is a subset of $Tr[t][id]$ for id in `AgentIds`
- $Lg[t][a] = Tr[t][a]$

Satisfaction of a protocol from the environment and agent perspective for traces and logs is defined by reducing it to associated event logs.

Definition 6.7 (Trace and Log Satisfaction). For a trace Tr and a log Lg as above

— $Tr \models_E \mathcal{P}$ if $EvsE(Tr) \models \mathcal{P}$ — the *environment* view of trace satisfaction
— $Tr \models_A \mathcal{P}$ if $EvsA(Tr) \models \mathcal{P}$ — the *agent* view of trace satisfaction
— $Lg \models_E \mathcal{P}$ if $EvsE(Lg) \models \mathcal{P}$ — the *environment* view of log satisfaction
— $Lg \models_A \mathcal{P}$ if $EvsA(Lg) \models \mathcal{P}$ — the *agent* view of log satisfaction

where

$$EvsE(Lg) = \bigcup\{Lg[t][eid] \mid t \text{ a time stamp of } Lg\}$$

$$EvsA(Lg) = \bigcup\{Lg[t][id] \mid t \text{ a time stamp of } Lg, id \text{ in } \texttt{AgentIds}\}$$

$$EvsE(Tr) = \bigcup\{Tr[t][eid] \mid t \text{ a time stamp of } Tr\}$$

$$EvsA(Tr) = \bigcup\{Tr[t][id] \mid t \text{ a time stamp of } Tr, id \text{ in } \texttt{AgentIds}\}$$

A useful log should collect enough information such that if Lg is a log for Tr then

$$Tr \models_E \mathcal{P} \Leftrightarrow Lg \models_E \mathcal{P} \text{ and } Tr \models_A \mathcal{P} \Leftrightarrow Lg \models_A \mathcal{P}$$

Example 6.8. The logs for the BotTeam contains all the logs of the two bots `b(0)` and `b(1)`, as well as of the environment. It is similar to the event log depicted in Example 6.5. Since we are collecting all the information mentioned in the protocol, described in Example 6.2, it satisfies the correspondence properties above between logs and traces.

In particular, the following event pattern in Example 6.2

```
atloc(b(0),pt(4, 0)) @ s00:Time treatStage(pt(4, 0),2) @ s01:Time
atloc(b(0),l0:Pt2) @ s02:Time atloc(b(0),pt(5, 4)) @ s03:Time
treatStage(pt(5, 4),2) @ s04:Time atloc(b(0),l1:Pt2) @ s05:Time
```

can be matched by the log in Example 6.5:

```
(atloc(b(0), pt(0,0)) @ 1) ... atloc(b(0), pt(5,4)) @ 20)
(treatStage(pt(4,0), 2) @ 9) ... (treatStage(pt(4,0), 4) @ 15)
(treatStage(pt(5,4), 2) @ 28) ... (treatStage(pt(5,4), 4) @ 34)
((energy(b(0), 100) @ 1)) ... (energy(b(0), 60) @ 34)
```

For example `s01:Time` is matched to `9`. Moreover, one can check that the constraints in Example 6.2 are satisfied or not by simply checking their validity. For example the constraint `s03:Time - s01:Time < 15` is satisfied as the drone reached the location `pt(5,4)` at time `28` and treated location `pt(4,0)` at time `9`.

7. Deviations and Diagnosis

Given definitions of system behavior (traces), protocols specifying events and invariants, and a notion of satisfaction $Tr \models \mathcal{P}$ we are interested in situations in which a soft agents system fails to satisfy a protocol. That is, we assume that under normal/ideal conditions with sensors and actuators working as expected, and absence of interference from the environment, the soft agents system will succeed in satisfying the protocol. In the real world, sensors may fail or be inaccurate, actuators may not have the expected effect, weather conditions and objects in the external environment may interfere or compete for resources. Under these conditions the soft agents system may fail to satisfy the protocol. Soft agents systems are intended to be resilient

and robust to faults and unexpected situations so it is important to determine the level of tolerance to different faults and to find the cause of failure when it happens.

We first informally classify what can go wrong, *i.e.*, in what ways satisfaction of a protocol can fail. These are called *deviations*. The aim is a classification that aids detection and fault ascription.

In the following we fix a scenario:

— a soft agents model and initial configuration, `iC`, with agent's identifiers in `AgentIds`, and a family of fault models, FM. There are fixed sets of sensors and actions available to each agent.
— an event language EL (sublanguage of the soft agents model knowledge language).
— a protocol $\mathcal{P} = (\mathit{TL}, \mathit{Eps}, \mathit{LO}, \mathit{GO}, \mathit{CS}, \mathit{Inv})$ over EL.
— an event log EvL from an execution trace from $\mathit{Tr}(\{\texttt{iC}\}, FM)$.

$\mathit{Tr}(\{\texttt{iC}\}, FM)$ stands for the set of traces $\mathit{Tr}(\{\texttt{addFaultModel(iC,fm)}\})$ for `fm` in FM. EvL can be from the environment perspective or the agent perspective.

Recall that TL is a list of timelines, one for each agent, where the timeline for an agent is the list of time stamp variables for events under control of that agent. Eps is the set of protocol event patterns over EL. LO is the set of local order constraints for each agent. GO is the set of global order constraints, relating events controlled by different agents. CS contains any additional constraints on variables of Eps. Inv contains invariant constraints, `epat => c`, with variables disjoint from the variables of Eps.

Suppose $\mathit{EvL} \not\models \mathcal{P}$. Thus there is no instantiation of $\mathcal{P}$ that can be embedded in EvL satisfying all the constraints $(\mathit{LO}, \mathit{GO}, \mathit{CS}, \mathit{Inv})$. What is wrong? What part of the protocol is unsatisfiable? We call the unsatisfied bits deviations and write $\mathit{Dev}(\mathit{EvL}, \mathcal{P})$. Since the invariants Inv quantify over all matches and are independent from the event patterns that make up the partial order of events, we consider two cases: (1)$\mathit{EvL} \not\models \mathit{Inv}$ or (2) $\mathit{EvL} \not\models (\mathit{Eps}, \mathit{LO}, \mathit{GO}, \mathit{CS})$. Note that the cases are not disjoint in the sense that both parts of the protocol could be unsatisfiable. In case (1) $\mathit{Dev}(\mathit{EvL}, \mathcal{P})$ includes the set of I_j in Inv such that $\mathit{EvL} \not\models I_j$. In the case (2) we consider three further cases: (2a) embeddings exist such that

$$\mathit{EvL} \models (\mathit{Eps}, \mathit{LO}, \mathit{GO})$$

but none satisfy CS; (2b) full embeddings of Eps in EvL exist but none satisfy all of the ordering constraints in $(\mathit{LO}, \mathit{GO})$; and (2c) no full embedding of Eps in EvL exists.

In case (2a) let $\sigma_0, \ldots, \sigma_k$ enumerate the embeddings of $(\mathit{Eps}, \mathit{LO}, \mathit{GO})$ in EvL and let C_j be the subset of CS such that $\sigma_j(C_j)$ is false. Then $\mathit{Dev}(\mathit{EvL}, \mathcal{P})$ includes the set $(\sigma_0, C_0), \ldots, (\sigma_k, C_k)$. The case (2b) is similar, but here the C_j are subsets of $(\mathit{LO}, \mathit{GO})$ as well as possibly from CS. In case (2c) we consider maximal embeddings $\sigma_0, \ldots, \sigma_k$ and cases as for (2a,b) restricting constraints to $dom(\sigma_j)$, *i.e.*, domain of σ_j, adding the missed events to the deviations.

Examples of deviations include

— (inv) The protocol specifies that energy reserve must be at least 35, `energy(id:Id,e:Nat) @ s:Time => e >= 35`, and the Event Log contains `(energy(b(1), 30) @ 32)`
— (cstr) The protocol contains event patterns `treatStage(pt(4,0),2) @ s01:Time treatStage(pt(4,0),4) @ s11:Time` and constraint `s11:Time - s01:Time < 10`. The Event Log contains



Fig. 2. Workflow for determining the cause of a protocol deviation. The dashed boxes, Scenario and Protocol Specification, are the inputs to the workflow.

`(treatStage(pt(4,0), 2) @ 11)` and `(treatStage(pt(4,0), 4) @ 51)` violating the constraint.

— (missing event) The protocol contains `atloc(b(1),pt(1,4)) @ s14:Time` and the Event log contains no match for `(atloc(b(1), pt(1,4)) @ s14:Time)`. Bot `b(1)` never reached point (1,4).

Recall that protocols specify finite missions. This means that it is enough to check for finite executions. Notice as well that not every fault may lead to protocol deviations. A key goal is to identify which faults can be the responsible for protocol deviations, and therefore need to be addressed by counter-measures, *e.g.*, increasing redundancy or more careful testing, from which faults do not cause protocol deviations.

8. Automated Deviation Identification from Execution Traces

In this Section, we introduce the machinery developed to partially automate the detection and diagnosis process. Figure 2 depicts the main steps in the workflow to analyze a soft agents specification. We assume, given as input, the scenario that is the subject of analysis, specified as an initial configuration with agents and environment, the fault models for the sensors, and the protocol specification. The workflow for detecting and diagnosing protocol deviations consists of the following steps:

1 We first use Maude's rewrite engine to construct an execution trace $\mathcal{T}$ and the associated event log for the protocol language.

2 Then we extract the event logs from the execution log. This is done by traversing the event log as described in Section 8.1.

3 Checking whether the event log satisfies the given protocol specification is done by transforming the problem to an SMT problem and using an SMT-solver. This is described in Sec-

tion 8.2. If the event log satisfies the protocol, *i.e.*, no deviations are found, then the process can repeat from the beginning with another execution trace.

4 Otherwise, we look for the cause of deviation by maximal subprotocols that are satisfiable and find execution deviations at times just after the last events of such maximal subprotocols. Execution deviations are caused by faulty sensors or actions. For example, if it was expected that a faulty speed sensor measured a speed s_1, but measured a speed $s_2 \neq s_1$, then this is an observable execution deviation. This is also described in Section 8.2.

5 To determine whether the identified execution deviation ES is the cause for the protocol deviation, we carry out a *gedanken* experiment by rewriting without any faults from the point exactly before ES occurred obtaining a new trace $\mathcal{T}'$.

6 We then extract the event logs of $\mathcal{T}'$ and check whether it satisfies the protocol. If so, ES is a cause for the protocol deviation. Otherwise, there is another execution deviation happening before ES that is a cause. We repeat by extracting the last execution deviation from $\mathcal{T}'$.

We note that the workflow is intended as a tool for exploring effects of different perturbations to determine which cause deviations that should be avoided. It is not complete, but our preliminary experiment indicate that it can be useful.

8.1. *Generating execution and event logs*

Generating an execution log has two realizations. The first is instrumenting the execution so that the final state contains not only the final system configuration, but also a log of the execution. The second is generating a log as a term that can be used as input for other functions, such as checking for deviations. These are different because the result of rewriting is just text that is printed as part of the Maude read-eval-print loop. However, due the Maude's support for reflection, going from the first to the second is easy as we will see below.

To instrument the execution, recall from section 4.2.2 that the `timeStep` rule provides a hook and data structures for log generation, as well as the function `updateLog` which invokes the model specific function `kbLog` to compute the configuration component of a log item.

In the BotTeam case study `kbLog` collects the agent sensor readings from the environment for the environment part of the log item, and collects, for each agent log component, the knowledge items used in deciding actions to propose. This includes location and energy knowledge items and information about targets for treatment and treatment status.

To check satisfaction of a soft agents protocol we extract an event log from an execution log. Given a log `lg`, the function `flatLog(lg,{none,none})` returns a pair `{ekbAll,lkbAll}` where `ekbAll` is the union of the environment KBs in the log items of `lg` and `lkbAll` is the union of the `lkb` attributes of each agent in the log items of `lg`. That is `ekbAll` is $\mathit{EvsA}($`lg`$)$ and `lkbAll` is $\mathit{EvsE}($`lg`$)$ as defined in Section 6.3.

8.2. *Protocol Deviations*

We developed a tool called `deviate` to detect deviations from a protocol by transforming a protocol plus event log into a logical theory and using the Yices SMT solver to find models of the event partial order component.

To do this `deviate` first translates the event log into a complete set of atomic and negated

atomic formula (clauses), with no free variables, in a finite language over a finite domain. It does this by assuming that if an event does not occur in the log, then the event is in fact false. The protocol is then translated into a simple set of quantifier free constraints over the theory constructed from the log. The satisfiability of the constraints is then checked by using, the python interface to, the Yices SMT solver. If there is no solution, then we can further investigate the cause by looking at various sub problems. Either by limiting the events in the log to an initial segment, or by restricting the form of the constraints generated from the protocol. In this manner, we can further clarify why the initial constraint set has no solution.

We illustrate the information provided by *deviate* using the following scenario: The initiator bot, `b(0)`, starts at `pt(0,1)` and the finisher bot, `b(1)`, starts at `pt(0,4)`. The fault model adds location faults for `b(1)` and the initiator bot waits until `b(0)` is within 3 moves of the target location to start treatment. Giving *deviate* the BotTeam protocol and the Environment view of the events from the log for the above scenario we can ask several questions. First, simply, does the event set satisfy the the protocol. *deviate* reports `UNSAT`. Next we ask about satisfaction at different levels:

— Level 0: Does a mapping σ exist giving times for the specified event patterns? The answer is yes (and a witness is returned).
— Level 1: Is there a level 0 σ that satisfies the local order constraints (LO)? Yes. (σ may be different.)
— Level 2: Is there a level 1 σ that also satisfies the global order constraints (GO)? Yes. (σ may again be different.)
— Level 3: Is there a level 2 σ that also satisfies the event constraints (CS)? NO! (`UNSAT`)
— Level 4: Is there a σ that also satisfies the protocol invariants (INV)? NO! (`UNSAT`)

Finally, the *frontier* often provides useful information. Intuitively, the frontier specifies a possible minimal stage of concurrent execution where things go wrong, i.e. all earlier stages are consistent with the protocol.

Given a protocol with timelines $[tl_0, ...tl_N]$ where each tl_j is a sequence of time stamp variables $s_{j,k}$ for $0 \leq k \leq N_j$; and an event log, the problem associated with $(i_0, ...i_N)$ is whether there is a mapping of the timeline variables $s_{j,k}$ for $0 \leq k \leq i_j)$ that satisfies the protocol restricted to these variables. The *frontier* is the set of tuples $(i_0, ...i_N)$ such that

— $i_j \leq N_j$
— the problem associated with $(i_0, ...i_N)$ is `UNSAT`,
— the problem associated with any (pointwise) smaller tuple is `SAT`.

In the case of our example the frontier has a single element $(1, 1)$ and deviate tells us that the unsat core includes `[(treatStage (pt 4 0) 4 s11), (treatStage (pt 4 0) 2 s01)]`. That is, the finisher bot is late at the first target point.

8.3. *Execution Deviations*

An execution deviation is a result of an agent action that differs from what is predicted by the agent's model, or a broken sensor reading. In soft agents, an execution deviation can be determined by comparing the local knowledge base of agents and the environment knowledge base. If they differ, it means that there is an execution deviation.

More precisely, an execution deviation (sort `EDev`) has one of the forms

`{ract,lkb,lkb0,ekb0}` `{ract,lkb,lkb0,{lkb1,ekb0}}`

where `ract` is the (ranked) action executed, `lkb` is the executing agent's local KB, `lkb0` is the knowledge items updated by the action carried out in `lkb0` according to the agent's model of the world, and `ekb0` is the knowledge items in the environment KB, after the action, that disagree with `lkb0`. In the second case `lkb1` are items in `lkb0` that have no corresponding update in the environment KB (for example if a move action failed, `lkb0` will have a location update, but the environment will not)[‡‡]. An execution deviation element (sort `EDevsElt`) is a time stamped set of execution deviations `[t:Time,edevs:EDevSet]`.

Intuitively, we compute the execution deviations from an execution log by comparing at each step of the log, the local knowledge base of an agent with the expected outcome of performing the same action (without fault models) at that step. [§§] If there is a disagreement, then there is an execution deviation.

Example 8.1. As an example of execution deviations, the following two `EDevsElts` are obtained from the execution log of the Bot Team scenario with location faults for the finisher bot, `b(1)`. At time 6 the location sensor gave no answer (`noLoc`) while the environment shows that `b(1)` is at `pt(1,0)`. No actions were carried out in this step as `b(0)` is waiting for `b(1)` to get close enough and `b(1)` doesn't know where it is.

```
[6,{{(zero).RVal,noAct},
(targets(pt(5,4)) @ 2)(target(pt(4,0)) @ 0)
 ... (energy(b(1),75) @ 6)(mode(b(1),enroute(pt(4, 0))) @ 6),
atloc(b(1), noLoc) @ 6,atloc(b(1), pt(1, 0)) @ 6}]
```

At time 11 `b(1)` is trying to charge, since it thinks its at the charging station (`pt(3,2)`). Thus it predicts that its energy increases from 55 to 75. However, from the environment perspective (ground truth) we find that the location of `b(1)` is `pt(3,1)`, charging has no effect, and thus the environment does not record a new value for energy.

```
[11,{{{cv(100),u(1)},charge(b(1))}, (targets(pt(5, 4)) @ 2) (target(pt(4,0)) @ 0)
  ...  (atloc(b(1), pt(3,2)) @ 11) (energy(b(1), 55) @ 11)
(mode(b(1), enroute(pt(4,0))) @ 11) @ 0, energy(b(1), 75) @ 12,
{energy(b(1), 75) @ 12,(none).KB}}]
```

8.4. *Checking Candidate Causes*

We continue the scenario in Section 8.2 with protocol $\mathcal{P}$, an event log EvL from log Lg for Tr in $Tr(iC, FM)$. To check that a candidate event in the log is a possible cause for a deviation in $Dev(EvL, \mathcal{P})$ we do a *gedanken* experiment. That is we find a trace Tr' in $Tr(iC, FM)$ that

[‡‡] Recall that in a log item, the environment KB reflects the state after the actions have been carried out while the agent local KBs represent the state before the actions, *i.e.*, the information used by the agents to choose actions. The time of a knowledge item is not updated if the information is not changed

[§§] This is implemented by the functions `log2edevsl` and `litem2edevs` available in the code repository.

agrees with Tr up to the event, avoids the identified event, and continues without further fault injection. ¶¶

The idea is inspired by counterfactual reasoning.

```
ceq gedanken(asys,asysB,n,j) = log1
if  log := genLog(asys, ((s n) * 3))    --- 3 rew per time unit
  /\ litem := subLog(log,n,1)           --- last trace element
  /\ ekb := getLIEnvKB(litem)           --- current environment KB
  /\ aconf := getLIAgents(litem)        --- current agent state
  /\ asys1 := updateSys(asysB,s n,ekb,aconf)
  /\ log1 := genLog(asys1,j) .          --- hoping for no deviation
```

`asys` is the system (with faults) generating Tr and `asysB` contains the base configuration information needed to continue, avoiding the candidate execution deviation. The `n` is the time just before the candidate execution deviation, and `j` is how long to continue to check that the protocol deviation is gone. The factor 3 is due to the fact that for every application of the `timeStep` rule there are two applications of the `doTask` rule, one for each agent. The 3 is scenario dependent. `asys1` augments the logged environment and agent state with knowledge that is constant, such as fence boundary or resource location knowledge, that are not logged, but needed to execute the rules. This information is contained in `asysB`. The logged environment KB does not contain fault models, that are the mechanisms for generating faulty executions, but it may contain obstacles as they are among the entities in the configuration. They must be removed for the *gedanken* experiment, as they are the other source of perturbations. Note that for the purpose of *gedanken* the log needs to collect all of the agent state that changes and that is used to decide actions. It also needs to collect all environment knowledge of changing information that is needed for sensor readings or to compute the effects of actions. This may extend what is collected just for determining protocol satisfaction.

The result of this function is a new event log `log1` which is then used to check for protocol deviations following the workflow shown in Figure 2. If there are no protocol deviations, then the candidate execution is deemed a possible cause.

Example 8.2. In the case of our BotTeam example with location faults for the finisher bot, `b(1)`, deviation analysis shows that even the first target point has late treatment, and the execution deviations list indicates deviations at times 6, 11, and onward. A *gedanken* experiment that eliminates faults after time 6,

```
red gedanken(addFaultsR(mkInitS(pt(4, 0) ; pt(5, 4), true),
 locsf(1), 500),mkInitS(pt(4, 0) ; pt(5, 4), true), 7,90) .
```

shows that the execution now satisfies the protocol. In particular we have events

```
(treatStage(pt(4, 0), 2) @ 11)  (treatStage(pt(4, 0), 4) @ 17)
(treatStage(pt(5, 4), 4) @ 35)  (treatStage(pt(5, 4), 2) @ 29)
```

Repeating the *gedanken* experiment by allowing the fault at 11 but no more we find that the finishing treatment at `pt(4,0)` is late, but the finishing treatment at `pt(5,4)` is on time.

¶¶ According to Wikipedia, a gedanken or thought experiment is a hypothetical situation in which a hypothesis is laid out for the purpose of thinking through its consequences. At design time the analyst lets the computer do the thinking. An agent doing runtime self diagnostics would use reflection to do a proper thought experiment.

```
(treatStage(pt(4, 0), 2) @ 11)  (treatStage(pt(4, 0), 4) @ 28)
(treatStage(pt(5, 4), 2) @ 34)  (treatStage(pt(5, 4), 4) @ 43)
```

9. Experimental Results

In this section we summarize the results of diagnosis for executions of the BotTeam case study, presented in Section 2, using two and three target locations and a variety of fault models. Our main purpose is not to be comprehensive on the set of experiments, but to illustrate the types of analysis that can be carried out using the proposed machinery and illustrate the different effects of different faults.

9.1. *Summary of BotTeam Execution Results*

The scenario for this case study has two bots on a 7×6 grid: `b(0)`, the initiator (class `BotI`), with sensors `locS energyS obstacleS treatS`, initially at `pt(0,1)`; and `b(1)`, the finisher (class `BotF`), with sensors `locS energyS obstacleS treatS supplyS`, initially at `pt(0,4)`. There is a charging station at `pt(3,2)` and a supply depot at `pt(3,3)`. Experiments were done for two target lists with initial system configurations `initS1a` (2 targets) and `initS2` (3 targets).

The fault models used in the experiments are described in Tables 1 and 2. The first column of the table is the name used for the fault model in the corresponding experiment summary table. The second column is the knowledge item(s) added to the environment KB specifying the fault. Finally, we also evaluated the impact of the choice of the random sequence used for deciding the occurrence of execution deviations due to the fault models. We specified fault models `mvaf1` and `mvaf1x` with the same fault model specification, but with different subsequences of the sequence generated by Maude. This means that the occurrence of execution deviations using these faults are generally different.

To evaluate the impact of faults on individual sensors, we used fault models for energy, location, movement actuator, and obstacles. We explain in the following the intuition of the fault models in Table 1. The meaning of the faults in Table 2 is similar but using different parameters.

— **ensfm1** corresponds to the fault model in Example 5.1. In particular, energy measurements may either not return a value or return a value 10 units below the agent's actual energy. Such wrong measurement may impact the bot's behavior making them decide to return to the station to recharge.
— **locsf1x** is similar to **ensfm1**, but considers measurement errors in the location of the bot, instead of the energy.
— **mvaf1** is similar to the fault model in Example 5.2. In particular, a bot may move erroneously with a probability of 1/5 with an error of `pt(-1,0)`. Moreover, the bot may fail to move altogether with probability of 1/10.
— **mvaf1x** is similar to **mvaf1** by using a different random seed.
— **Obs4-2** is a fault model where there is an unknown obstacle at position `pt(4,2)`.

Tables 3 and 4 summarize, respectively, the results of experiments using the two target scenario, `initS1a`, and the three target scenario, `initS2` with the SA protocol described in Example 6.2. The Faults column names the fault model used (as defined above). The Close column

Fault Model Name	Fault Model Specification	Random Seed
ensfm1	sF(b(1),energyS,simpleFT,sFP(1/10,1/5,intV(-10))) @ 0	rand 500
locsf1x	sF(b(1),locS,simpleFT,sFP(1/10,1/5,ptV(pt(0,1)))) @ 0	rand 500
mvaf1	aF(b(1),mvA,simpleFT,sFP(1/10,1/5,ptV(pt(0,-1)))) @ 0	
mvaf1x	aF(b(1),mvA,simpleFT,sFP(1/10,1/5,ptV(pt(0,-1)))) @ 0	rand 500
Obs4-2	class(ob(0), Obstacle) atloc(ob(0), pt(4, 2)) @ 0	

Table 1. *Fault models used in for the experiments involving the 2 target scenario* `initS1a`.

Fault Model Name	Fault Model Specification	Random Seed
ensf0	sF(b(0),energyS,simpleFT,sFP(1/10,1/5,intV(10))) @ 0	rand 500
ensf1	sF(b(1),energyS,simpleFT,sFP(1/10,1/5,intV(10))) @ 0	
locsf0x	sF(b(0),locS,simpleFT,sFP(1/10,1/5,ptV(pt(0,1)))) @ 0	rand 500
locsf1	sF(b(1),locS,simpleFT,sFP(1/10,1/5,ptV(pt(0,1)))) @ 0	rand 500
mvaf1	aF(b(1),mvA,simpleFT,sFP(1/10,1/5,ptV(pt(0,-1)))) @ 0	

Table 2. *Fault models used in for the experiments involving the 3 target scenario* `initS2`.

specifies how close the `BotI` bot requires the `BotF` bot to be before beginning treatment at a target location. Intuitively, on the one hand, the closer the bots have to be, the less is the risk that the interval between treatments constraints is not satisfied, but on the other hand, the greater is the risk that the overall time of treatment target is not satisfied. For the experiments the possible values used are 1 and 3 distance units. The PDevs column lists the minimal (with respect to the protocol partial order) protocol deviation(s) if any. The EDevs column gives the number of execution deviations prior to the protocol deviation. In the Gedanken column a +/- indicates that the *gedanken* experiment defined by the candidate execution deviation causes confirmed/failed to confirm that elimination of the deviation events eliminated the protocol deviation. na abbreviates "not applicable".

We use the following notation for protocol deviations.

— delta(x,y) abbreviates: the log events have

```
(treatStage(pt(x,y),2) @ t0) (treatStage(pt(x,y),4) @ t1)
```

with `t1 - t0 >= 10` violating the constraint on delay between initial and final treatments.

— delta((x0,y0),(x1,y1)) abbreviates: the log events have

```
(treatStage(pt(x1,y1),2) @ t0) (tloc(b(0),pt(x0,y0)) @ t1)
```

with `t1 - t0 >= 15` violating the constraint on time between target locations.

— `atloc(b(j),pt(x,y))` indicates an event that was expected by the protocol specification is missing.

From Tables 3 and 4 we see that in all but one case this process was able to identify execution deviations which, when removed, eliminated the protocol deviation. Already from these (non-comprehensive) experiments, it seems that for the scenario with two targets, faults on location and obstacle are most damaging. In contrast, for the scenario with three targets, the impact of energy and movement sensors/actuators start to have a greater impact. This is expected as adding an additional target results in bots needing to traverse greater distances thus consuming more energy and having tighter deadlines.

Faults	Close	PDevs	Edevs[0]	Gedanken
none	3,1	none	none	na
ensfm1	3,1	none	6	na
locsf1x	3	delta(4,0),delta(5,4)	6	+
mvaf1	3,1	none	10	na
mvaf1x	3,1	none	8	na
Obs4-2	3,1	atloc(b(1),pt(5,4))	0[1]	+

Table 3. *Summary of experiment results for the 2 target scenario `initS1a`. If PDevs is none then EDevs counts deviations in the full execution. Execution deviations due to obstacles are not currently collected. In this experiment, removing the obstacle at event before deviation corrects the behavior.*

Faults	Close	PDevs	Edevs	Gedanken
none	3,1	none	none	na
ensf0x	3,1	delta((1,4),(2,0)	2,1	+
ensf1	3	delta(2,0)	5	+
	1	none	11	na
locsf0x	3	delta(1,4)	6	- [2]
	1	treatStage(pt(2,0),2)	1	+
locsf1x	3	delta(5,1)	8	+
	3,1	atloc(b(1),pt(2,0))	1	+
mvaf1	3,1	delta(2,0)	1	+
	3,1	delta((2,0),(1,4))		+

Table 4. *Summary of experiment results for the 3 target scenario `initS2`.*

There is one exceptional case involved in the three target scenario with location sensor faults for `BotI`. The deviation is an event for which `BotF` is responsible. The actual problem is that `BotF` passes through a location adjacent to the target location on the way to the supply depot. It gets stuck there waiting for `BotI` to finish its treatment, because the constraint system gives 0 preference to moving if it is adjacent to its target and `BotI` is there treating. For the diagnosis system to understand this, more information is needed about the constraints underlying the bots' action decisions.

10. Related Work

The use of soft constraints and explicit representation of cyber and physical aspects has been discussed in (Kappé et al., 2019) and (Talcott et al., 2015; Talcott et al., 2016; Mason et al., 2017) respectively. Here we focus on work related to diagnosis.

Comparison with other CPS specification languages: In (Kappé et al., 2019) an automaton-based formalism for compositional design was developed along with an extension of Linear Temporal Logic with two unary connectives that reflect the compositional structure of actions. A method was developed to use the logic and an algebra of action preferences to diagnose undesired behavior by tracing the falsification of a specification back to one or more culpable components. Instead of using temporal logics, we propose a protocol specification which is a domain-specific specification language for mission requirements. A key advantage of this specification language is that it is similar to the operations related to the planning problems that are considered for mission accomplishment for CPS. This domain-specific aspect of protocol specification improves, arguably, the understanding of requirements to CPS engineers. It remains open, although likely, to translate these specifications into fragments of suitable quantitative temporal logic formulas.

The soft agents CPS model is complimentary to the work on hybrid systems (Mitra, 2021). It abstracts from details at the level of differential equations and device controllers to focus on short term adaptive planning. Issues that are similar in spirit arise at multiple levels. Reachability analysis is an important tool in both cases, but may be concerned with different properties.

Falsification is an important topic in hybrid systems research (Frehse and Althoff, 2021). In falsification the problem is to develop efficient methods for finding inputs that drive a system to a bad state. Falsification is also relevant in security protocol analysis, where falsification means finding an attack that leads to violation of a security property (Basin et al., 2012; Schmidt et al., 2012; Basin et al., 2017). The detection and diagosis problem studied in the current paper is concerned with determining which environmental perturbations such as faulty sensors or actuators or obstacles cause protocol violations. The use of attack models (how an intruder can manipulate messages or emulate honest participants) in security protocol analysis is analagous to the use of fault models in our work, in the sense that it used to identify threats/perturbations which which cause a system to fail to satisfy given properties. In (Basin et al., 2012) the form of attacks found for different properties is used to (manually) identify 'root' causes and suggest repairs. In (Schmidt et al., 2012) constraint solving is used to verify/falsify protocols.

Comparison with related Counter-Factual Work: Our use of 'gedanken experiments' was motivated by (Gössler and Stefani, 2016; Laurent et al., 2018; Gössler and Stefani, 2020). A general semantic framework for fault ascription is proposed in (Gössler and Stefani, 2016) based on counterfactual analysis to identify necessary and sufficient causes of faults in component-based systems. The key is an operation CF(X,L) that constructs from a log L and candidate violations X, a set of counterfactual configurations modeling system behavior "if X had not happened", and there are no new component failures. This work is extended and refined in (Gössler and Stefani, 2020) including new requirements and properties for the counterfactual construction operator and a concrete example. In (Gössler and Stefani, 2020) hyperproperties are also considered, which is an interesting direction for future work.

GS (Gössler and Stefani, 2020) compare counter-factual reasoning to the mathematical definition of causality proposed by Pearl and Halpern (PH) (J. Halpern, 2005; Pearl, 2000) PH models are deterministic while CPS systems are distributed, non-deterministic systems. PH causes are observable, while GS ascription may propose unobserved causes. In the PH formalism there is no notion of specification or fault in causality.

A symbolic approach to fault ascription in real-time systems based on timed automata is pre-

sented in (Gössler and Astefanoaei, 2014). Here an execution trace violating a safety property is analyzed by counterfactual reasoning which is reduced to a model-checking problem.

(Laurent et al., 2018) defines the semantics of counterfactual analysis for traces of events of stochastic rule-based models. The objective is to construct a causal diagram that explains how a phenomenon of interest occurred, given a trace of a system behavior. The semantics is based on sampling counterfactual trajectories that are probabilistically as close to the factual trace as a given intervention permits them to be.

Comparing (Gössler and Stefani, 2020) (GS), (Laurent et al., 2018) (LF) and the current work (SA) we note that the intended contexts of use are somewhat different: SA is focused on design time, GS seems to be focused on run time analysis. GS and SA aim to find causes of faulty behavior in software/cyber-physical systems while LF is using causal analysis to understand mechanisms of natural (biological) processes. SA and LF use rule based component specifications and trace semantics (LF traces are stochastic simulations) while GS uses configuration structures to describe components and systems with added (faulty) behaviors. SA uses explicit fault models to add faulty behavior to systems. GS properties are configuration structures while SA properties are specified by protocols. In GS logs not all events are observable while SA logs contain all the events relevant to the protocol specification, reflecting a difference between design time and runtime analysis. GS proposes counterfactual constructors to generate all behaviors consistent with a given log where given violations no longer happen. SA provides mechanisms to identify potential causes of violations and a mechanism to check by generating traces avoiding the candidates. The LF approach additionally provides a means for measuring distance of the counter factual traces from the original. An interesting direction of future work is to recast some of the GS requirements for counterfactual constructors in the SA setting. Another interesting direction for developing the SA approach is to consider distributed detection and diagnosis at runtime, which will entail some events being unobservable.

There are many protocols for carrying out diagnosis. For example. protocols are used in (Debouk et al., 2000) as a mechanism to define diagnosers for distributed event systems. Here each component does local diagnosis and reports to a central coordinator component that carries out system level diagnosis. A protocol specifies the communication and system level decision rules. To the best of our knowledge the use of protocols to specify behavior whose deviations are to be diagnosed in the context of cyber-physical systems seems new.

11. Conclusions

This paper presents a formal framework enabling the diagnosis of cause for deviations from desired behavior to support design time decisions. Our formal framework extends the soft agents framework which is implemented in Maude. In particular, we extend Soft Agents with fault models, define a protocol specification language, from which protocol deviations are defined. We then propose a workflow for determining causes for deviations. This workflow is partially automated by using Maude and an SMT-solver. We demonstrate the workflow with some experiments involving a proof of concept BotTeam scenario.

There are several directions that we are currently investigating. The first is on the expressiveness of the protocol language. We suspect that the proposed workflow can be extended to support further protocol constructs, such as finite branching and finite unfolding. We are also considering

other forms of constraints involving other than time variables such as resources, following our previous work on protocol security (Urquiza et al., 2021). We have developed and tested the ideas using simple, easy to understand examples. An important future direction is developing methods to scale to more complex systems. There are several approaches to investigate including reducing interleaving by replacing some rewrite rules by equations, using symbolic rewriting where configurations are pairs consisting of a term with variables and a boolean condition constraining the variables (Nigam and Talcott, 2022; Lee et al., 2021), and leveraging modularity. Finally, we are also investigating further scenarios, such as scenarios involving autonomous vehicles.

Acknowledgements. Kim and Mason were partially supported by the U. S. Office of Naval Research under award number N00014-15-1-2202. Talcott was partially supported by the U. S. Office of Naval Research under award numbers N00014-15-1-2202 and N00014-20-1-2644. Nigam was partially by CNPq grant 303909/2018-8.

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